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Appellate Court for the First District in an earlier case.20 That
case has now been followed, by the Appellate Court for the Third
District, in Thom.As v. State Bank of Saybrook,2 1 where it was held
that the conditional seller's rights in a farm combine were not
prejudiced by a period of inaction lasting four and one-half months
after the indebtedness became due at least as against the asserted
rights of a judgment creditor of the purchaser.
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
While issues of practice and procedure are presented in almost
every case taken to the reviewing courts, many of the points pre-
sented are so well-settled as to be almost trite. Some cases do,
however, involve unsettled questions of procedural law, although
often of slight importance, so such cases are here summarized and
arranged in substantially the same order as these questions would
probably occur in the conduct of litigation.
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES
Without question, the practitioner should be concerned with
the matter of jurisdiction, particularly in the sense of the power
to hear and determine, for otherwise his efforts may come to
naught. The existence of monetary limitations upon the jurisdic-
tion of certain of the inferior courts of this state has produced
problems as to whether or not the litigant may (1) state a case
involving more but seek only the jurisdictional figure,' or (2) sue
for more upon a case involving more but voluntarily remit that
part of a verdict in excess of the jurisdictional limitation.2 An-
other innovation has been introduced by the case of Binger v.
Baker s a suit originally brought before a justice of the peace
upon a claim exceeding $500 wherein verdict in excess of that
20 American Type Founders Co. v. Metropolitan Credit & Discount Corp., 271 Il.
App. 380 (1933), noted in 13 CHIOAoO-KMNT REvIEw 28.
21328 Ill. App. 184, 65 N. E. (2d) 626 (1946).
1 Dahlgren v. Israel, 204 Ill. App. 340 (1917), abst. opin.
2G. B. Hemingway Co. v. Keagle, 181 Ill. App. 5 (1913).
3 326 Ill. App. 639, 63 N. E. (2d) 256 (1945).
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figure was returned but voluntarily remitted to the jurisdictional
level, in which it was held that a reviewing court, upon trial de
novo, might also permit remittitur, so long as it preceded judg-
ment, to prevent loss of jurisdiction. That result seems to have
been achieved upon the assumption that the language of the Jus-
tices and Constables Act, authorizing jurisdiction on claims
"originally exceeding five hundred dollars, if the same, at the time
of rendition of the judgment, are reduced by credits dr deductions"
to the maximum jurisdictional figure, 4 permitted voluntary waiver
of part of the plaintiff's demand. Early decisions of the Illinois
Supreme Court would seem to require, however, that the "credits
or deductions" referred to should consist only of "fair credits,"
i.e. payments on account of the excessive debt made by the judg-
ment debtor rather than fictitious ones granted by the creditor.5
There is still a possibility that the Illinois Supreme Court
may clarify the effect of the decision in Werner v. Illinois Central
Railroad Comnpany,6 at least insofar as it concerns the divorce
jurisdiction of the several city courts in the state, for it has
granted leave to appeal from the decision in Conrad v. Conrad.7
The Appellate Court had there held valid a decree for divorce
based upon a charge of desertion which commenced outside of the
state, had continued for more than one year," but where the plain-
tiff, although a long-time resident of the state, had not been a
resident of the city in whose court he brought the action for a full
year prior to the filing of the complaint. If the jurisdictional
words "in and for" the city9 limit city courts to cases wherein at
least the plaintiff is a resident thereof 10 and then only if the cause
4 I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 79, § 16(6).
5 See Hugunin v. Nicholson, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 575 (1839), where the court adverted
to the fact that "no evidence was adduced showing that the credit was given solely
for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction," and Harris v. Jenks, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.)
475 (1840).
6 379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942), noted In 21 OHiCAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
116.
7 329 Ill. App. 33, 66 N. E. (2d) 738 (1946).
s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Oh. 40, § 1.
9 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 37, § 333.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 40, § 6; McF'arlin v. McFlarlin, 384 I1. 428, 51 N. E.
(2d) 520 (1943).
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of action arose therein," it would seem that no complete cause of
action based on desertion could arise unless the plaintiff had
resided in the city for a continuous period of one whole year prior
to the filing of the complaint. 12 Whatever the outcome of the
appeal, it is hoped that the court will not fail to provide clarifica-
tion, particularly since the legislature has failed to act.'3
The courts have determined, however, that city courts do
possess statutory authority to transfer a cause improperly com-,
menced therein to a court of competent jurisdiction. 4 The holding
in Herb v. Pitcairn'5 now recognizes that a proceeding erroneously
instituted in a city court lacking jurisdiction to hear and determine
the controversy is, nevertheless, adequately "commenced" within
the meaning of the statute of limitations and may be transferred
to a competent court even though such transfer does not occur
until after the limitation period has expired. The same case also
notes that, upon transfer, no additional process is necessary to
give the transferee court jurisdiction over the parties if personal
jurisdiction has already been obtained.
Selection having been made of the right court, the practitioner
must next choose the right county in which to conduct his litiga-
tion for proper jurisdiction involves aspects of venue as well as
the general power to hear and determine. The venue provisions
of the Illinois Civil Practice Act' 6 are reasonably comprehensive
and have been productive of little difficulty. It is not surprising,
therefore, to find the court, in Horn v. Illinois Central Railroad
11 Werner v. Illinois Cent. Railroad Co., 379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942)
Riddlesbarger v. Riddlesbarger, 324 Ill. App. 176, 57 N. E. (2d) 901 (1944).
12 While Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 40, -§ 3, requires only one year of residence "in
the statc," the import of the Werner case would indicate that no complete cause of
action has arlsen "in" the city short of a full year of cessation of cohabitation
within its borders. Anything less would not constitute a ground for absolute
divorce: In re Schriver's Estate, 289 Ill. App. 581, 7 N. E. (2d) 611 (1937).
1 The 1945 amendment to the City Courts Act, Laws 1945, p. 652, is entirely
silent on the subject.
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 146, § 36. Transfer between circuit courts, by reason
of such statute, was deemed proper in Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Indus-
trial Commn., 293 Ill. 62, 127 N. E. 80 (1920).
15 392 Ill. 138, 64 N. E. (2d) 519 (1946), noted in 41 Ill. L. Rev. 105. Prior pro-
ceedings in the same case may be noted in 325 U. S. 77, 65 S. Ct. 954, 89 L. Ed.
1483 (1945) ; 324 U. S. 117, 65 S. Ct. 459, 89 L. Ed. 789 (1945) ; 384 Il. 237, 51
N. E. (2d) 277 (1943).
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, §§ 131-5.
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Company,"7 holding that it was error to bring suit in Cook County,
Illinois, for an alleged violation of the Civil Rights Act 8 which
had occurred in Marion County. Although the action is of transi-
tory character, the Civil Rights Act specifically directs that suit
be brought in the county where the "offense was committed,'"9
and the venue provisions of the Civil Practice Act operate to
localize the remedy to the same county.20 The fact that one of the
defendants was a non-resident corporation whose registered agent
was located in Cook County was regarded as unimportant in view
of the jurisdictional limits placed- on the right to sue.21 Any diffi-
culty in obtaining service on the registered agent, because he was
located in a county other than the one in which the suit must be
brought, is obviated by other provisions of the Civil Practice Act.22
The court also, incidentally, held that no action could be predicated
on the alleged refusal to serve plaintiff at a station restaurant,
because of race and color, either at common law or under the
Public Utilities Act,23 unless it was alleged that the plaintiff was a
passenger of the utility, actual or intended, and that the operation
of the restaurant was connected with the transportation of persons
by the defendant, since there is no duty to serve all persons without
discrimination.
It then becomes a matter of concern to see to it that the litiga-
tion be promptly instituted to prevent the bar of the statute of
limitations. Two cases are noteworthyin that regard. In one of
them, arising in the United States District Court, the problem was
with respect to whether or not the action had been instituted within
the applicable period. In Winrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc.,
24
the defendant had composed and printed an issue of its magazine
bearing the publication date of August 8, 1942, but had distributed
17 327 Ill. App. 498. 64 N. E. (2d) 574 (1946).
18 111. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 38, § 125 et see.
19 Ibid., § 126.
2OIbtd., Ch. 110, 1133(2).
21 See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153,
84 L. Ed. 167, 128 A. L. R. 1437 (1939).
22111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 134(1).
23 Ibid., Ch. 111%, § 77.
-&62 F. Supp. 249 (1945), noted in 24 COrICAGO-KENT LAW REVI"W 278, 59 Harv.
L. Rev. 136, 21 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 309.
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the same by July 29, 1942. Plaintiff, on August 4, 1943, sued on
the ground that an article therein had defamed him. Motion for
summary judgment on the ground the action was barred25 was
denied when it appeared, from defendant's own affidavits, that
supplementary copies of the publication were mailed when sub-
scribers reported either the non-receipt of their copies or receipt
thereof in a damaged condition. Whether subsequent mailings are
to be regarded as parts of the original wrong or as additional
wrongs is a matter of some conflict among the decided cases, 26 but
the decision, and the accompanying opinion, represent the best
discussion of the problem to date.
While the Civil Practice Act properly indicates a liberality
with respect to the amendment of pleadings in a case started in
apt time to prevent rise of the claim that the case stated in the
amended pleadings is barred by the statute of limitations, 27 that
statute seems to have been carried to undue and improper lengths
by the Appellate Court decision in Piper v. Epstein. 25 In that
case, a complaint for wrongful death had been filed in apt time
against certain defendants. Shortly before the expiration of the
limitation period, summons was issued and served on some addi-
tional defendants, but no amended complaint was filed as to them
until two days after the one-year period had elapsed. Their claim
that the action was barred was rejected on the reasoning that the
subsequent filing of the amended complaint related back to the
commencement of the original action. While that holding would
not be open to criticism insofar as it applied to the original de-
fendants, 29 there is grave doubt whether it is correct as to newly-
added parties.80 Since the change in the Civil Practice Act with
respect to just what constitutes the starting of an original suit at
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 83, § 14, requires that the action be commenced within
one year next after the cause of action accrues.
26 Compare the instant case with Means v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F.
Supp. 993 (1939), and Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660 (1939).
27 II. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 170(2).
28 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RVI w 170, 34 I1. B. J. 173.
29 Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Bowman Dairy Co., 369 Il1. 222, 16 N. ID. (2d) 838
(1988).
so See Fitzpatrick v. Pitcairn, 371 111. 203, 20 N. E. (2d) 280 (1939).
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law,81 there is reason to believe that no summons is effective unless
it is based on some sufficient pleading filed in apt time 2 and that
such pleading cannot have retroactive effeQt as to persons not
named in the original suit.
Capacity to sue may sometimes be a matter of concern for a
suit by the wrong person as plaintiff or against the wrong person
as defendant could well lead to frustration. One such problem was
presented in Martineau v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,83 where an
Oklahoma administrator brought suit in a federal district court
located in Illinois to recover for the wrongful death of his decedent
which had occurred in an airplane accident happening in South
Carolina. Defendant there claimed that no suit could be main-
tained since the Illinois Injuries Act 4 could have no extraterri-
torial effect and the capacity of the administrator to sue had to
be measured by local law pursuant to Rule 17(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 Motion to dismiss was denied, how-
ever, on the ground that state laws restricting the jurisdiction of
state courts were inapplicable to federal tribunals.8 6 Had the suit
been brought in a state court, however, it would have been neces-
sary for the plaintiff to show (a) that a right of action existed
under the laws of the place where the death occurred, and (b)
that service of process upon the defendant was impossible in such
place.3 7 Reminder was also added, by Guth v. Texas Company,
38
that a tenant in common may not, in his own right, maintain an
action against a stranger for injury done to the joint property
but must join his co-tenants as joint plaintiffs.
There is little new to report on the subject of choosing an
81 Prior to 1937 an action was "commenced" by the issuance of summons. By
Laws 1937, p. 989, Ii. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 129, the legislature has directed
that the action is commenced by the filing of a complaint, thereby assimilating the
practice to that which formerly prevailed in equity proceedings.
32 See discussion of this point in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 170 at 174.
3 64 F. Supp. 235 (1946).
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 70, § 2.
35 28 U. S. C. A., following § 723c.
36 See also Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 110 F. (2d) 401, 132
A. L. R. (1940), cert. den. 311 U. S. 720, 60 S. Ct. 1107, 85 L. Ed. 469 (1940).
37 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 70, § 2.
3 864 F. Supp. 733 (1946).
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appropriate remedy, for no change has occurred in established
doctrines regulating suits at law. That substantial distinctions
still remain between actions in equity and suits at law, despite the
statutory provisions purporting to abolish the same,39 is well-
evidenced by the holding in Illinois Minerals Company v. Miller.
4 0
The plaintiff therein had begun a proceding in Illinois based upon
a complaint containing several counts, some of which were equita-
ble in character while others advanced a legal demand for dam-
ages. The same plaintiff had also instituted a suit at law in
another state against certain of the defendants to recover damages
based on the same claim. On motion by the defendants to compel
plaintiff to elect to proceed either at law or in equity, the trial
court ordered that an election be made and, upon default thereof,
dismissed the Illinois action and enjoined plaintiff from prosecut-
ing the suit instituted elsewhere. Justification for that action, if
any existed, was apparently predicated upon the idea that the
doctrine of election of remedies applied to the case. When revers-
ing the decision, the Appellate Court for the Fourth District noted
that the situation was not one calling for an election as between
inconsistent remedies, 41 since the equity aspect of the case sought
to prevenA future harm similar to that which had already occurred
and upon which the damage claim was predicated, nor was it one
in which the litigant sought to maintain two suits of the same
character in the same jurisdiction,4 2 but rather involved the ques-
tion of whether or not two distinct actions could be maintained
upon one set of facts when, apparently, everything could be accom-
plished in one equitable proceeding with concomitant incidental
legal relief. On that score, it concluded that as the court hearing
the equitable claim might find there was no ground for exercising
equitable jurisdiction, hence be unable to assess damages as an
incident thereto,43 it was improper to force an election between
39 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 155.
4o 327 Ill. App. 596, 65 N. E. (2d) 44 (1946). Related parts of the same litiga-
tion may be noted in 318 Il. App. 423, 48 N. E. (2d) 424 (1943).
41 Pyle v. Crebs, 112 I1. App. 480 (1903).
42 In such case, the proper method of attack would be by motion to dismiss the
second action; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 172. See also Smith v. Billings, 62
Ill. App. 77 (1896).
4S Hogg v. Hohmann, 330 Ill. 589, 162 N. E. 209 (1928).
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the two claims prior to a determination of the equitable issues. It
indicated that the better practice, under the circumstances, would
be to hear the equitable aspects of the case first, for if the legal
demand was first determined questions might arise as whether or
not the legal remedy was adequate enough to make resort to equity
unnecessary. The mere fact that the claims were joined in-one
suit 44 was not regarded as overriding fundamental distinctions
that still exist between law and equity.
The only other case involving anything of significance with
respect to the scope of equitable remedies is the case of Smith v.
Illinois Adjustment Finance Company.45 The plaintiff therein, a
practicing lawyer, sought an injunction restraining the defendant,
a corporation, from unlawfully engaging in the practice of law. A
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had
(1) an adequate remedy at law,46 and (2) was not a proper person
to complain, was sustained in the trial court. The Appellate Court
for the Second District reversed, holding that neither contention
was sound, when it concluded that any legal remedy was inade-
quate since the corporation had already been fined but persisted
in its unlawful conduct, and that the plaintiff, as a licensed prac-
ticing attorney, had a sufficiently valuable franchise, if not a prop-
erty right, to warrant the interposition of equity to protect it.
The statutory action for partition necessarily presupposes
that several persons must have interests in the premises sought to
be divided otherwise there is no occasion for the use of that rem-
edy,47 although the law recognizes that, after their several interests
have been determined, the proceedings may be discontinued, if
the parties have adjusted their respective rights, without nullify-
ing thp force of the decree. 48 When the court held, in Kohl v.
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 168, permits the joinder of legal and equitable
causes but directs the court, in its discretion, to order separate trials.
45 326 Ill. App. 654, G3 N. E. (2d) 264 (1945).
46 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 411, make's it unlawful for a corporation to prac-
tice law, and § 413 provides for a penalty for so doing. People v. People's Stock
Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176'N. E. 901 (1931), regarded such conduct as a
contempt of court.
47 Ill. Rev. Stat- 1945, Ch. 106, § 1, recites that when land is held "in joint
tenancy, tenancy in common or co-pareenary" a partition may be compelled by any
interested person.
48 Ibid., § 41.
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.Montgomery,4 9 that equitable interests might be converted into
legal interests through a decree of partition, it laid the foundation
for the still more unusual decision in Yakich v. Smietanka.50 In
that case, apparently the only one of its kind in the country, the
holder of an equitable interest sought partition against the holder
of the legal title and the other equitable owners. At the time of
the inception of the proceedings there was no question of the right
to maintain the action. During the pendency thereof, however,
plaintiff acquired the outstanding equitable interests and thereby
gained the right to obtain the sole legal title to the premises. A
decree ordering the conveyance of the legal title was questioned
on the ground that, in the absence of a severalty of interests, the
foundation of a partition suit was gone. It was, nevertheless, held
that because partition was no longer feasible was no reason why
the court should not proceed to give whatever relief was proper
under the circumstances.
Payment of charges due the clerk of the court for filing papers
and docketing the cause is a customary incident to the institution
of litigation. Refusal to pay such charges in advance would, of
course, justify the clerk in refusing to perform his functions, but
his failure to demand payment would not prevent the court from
obtaining jurisdiction,51 for statutory requirements that costs
"shall be paid in advance" are generally regarded as intended
primarily for the protection of the officers of the court. A different
rule may be applied, however, where the payment of costs within
a specified time is made a condition precedent to an appeal, for
there the element of payment may be regarded as a jurisdictional
fact. 52 A common-sense approach to the problem may be observed
in McClelland v. Gorrell's Estate,5 where the litigant was unable
to determine the amount of the costs payable on an appeal but
gave the clerk, in apt time, a signed blank check with authority to
49 379 I1. 579, 41 N. E. (2d) 762 (1942).
50 392 Il. 53, 63 N. E. (2d) 718, 162 A. L. R. 223 (1945).
5'Dowle v. Chicago, Waukegan & North Shore Railway Co., 214 Ill. 49, 73 N. E.
354 (1905) ; Elles v. Industrial Commission, 375 11. 107, 30 N. E. (2d) 615 (1940).
52 Davison v. Heinrich, 340 Ill. 349, 172 N. E. 770 (1930)..
53 327 Iil. App. 224, 63 N. E. (2d) 884 (1945). It is understood that appeal
therefrom has been dismissed.
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1945-1946
complete the same for the required amount when the correctness
thereof had been determined. It was held that such conduct,
particularly since the check was paid on presentation, amounted
to a compliance with the statute5 4 and prevented dismissal of the
appeal.
PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS
The essentials of good pleading require that a complaint
should contain a complete and precise statement of a cause of
action. If any essential element is lacking through failure to allege,
the insufficiency of the complaint may be raised at any time.5 5 If,
however, the defect consists merely in making an imperfect allega-
tion, any insufficiency in that regard may be aided by verdict for
the time to criticize errors of that nature is in the pleading stage.5 6
A modern application of the doctrine of aider by verdict may be
found in the case of Lasko v. Meier57 wherein plaintiff charged that
a certain principal, through his servant and agent, by misfeasant
conduct negligently injured plaintiff in the course of an automobile
accident. Both principal and servant were named as parties de-
fendant. No motions of any kind were directed against the com-
plaint. At the trial of the case, the principal was dismissed out
on plaintiff's motion and the case proceeded, without amendment,
to verdict and judgment against the servant. The latter claimed,
on appeal, that the complaint was totally insufficient to state a
cause of action against him because it contained only a statement
that the principal, through the servant and agent, had committed
certain negligent acts. It was held that any insufficiency in that
regard was cured by verdict for the allegation that certain mis-
feasant negligent acts were done by the principal acting through
the servant was the equivalent, after verdict, of a charge that they
were done by the servant in person. It is doubtful, however, if
that result would have been reached had the complaint merely
54 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, §§ 484 and 486.
55 Jollet Steel Co. v. Shields, 134 Ill. 209, 25 N. D. 569 (1890).
56 Ladd v. Plggot, 114 Ill. 647, 2 N. E. 503 (1885).
57394 Ill. 71, 67 N. E. (2d) 162 (1946), affirming 327 Ii. App. 5, 63 N. E. (2d)
531 (1945).
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shown a nonfeasant breach of duty owed by the agent and servant
to the principal for then the complaint would have wholly failed
to allege a wrong on the part of the servant of which the plaintiff
might have had cause to complain. 58
Section 34 of the Civil Practice Act directs that every com-
plaint shall contain specific prayers for the relief to which the
pleader deems himself entitled.5 9 Whether that provision infer-
entially bars the use of a general prayer for relief such as was
heretofore common in equity proceedings is a matter of some
doubt,0° but the tenor of the decisions interpreting that section, at
least in cases where the defendant has appeared and is present in
court, would seem to make that question academic. It had hereto-
fore been held that the use of a specific prayer for one type of
relief would not prevent the granting of another distinct type of
relief even though not requested, provided the facts alleged and
proved warranted the same.6' Another application of that idea
may be found in Swofford v. Swofford 2 where a fund was im-
pressed with a trust although there was neither specific nor general
prayer for that type of relief. Apparently, unless the defendant
calls attention to the fact that prejudice by reason of surprise will
result from the change in theory underlying the litigation,68 the
prayer for relief, except in default cases, has become no more than
a stylized conclusion to a well-drawn complaint.
Occasionally new matter arises subsequent to the filing of the
original complaint which cannot be presented simply by way of
amendment 4 and can be injected only through the use of supple-
mental pleadings. Distinctions over the right to use such plead-
ings in law actions in contrast to the rules applicable to equitable
58 Smith v. Rutledge, 332 Ill. 150, 163 N. E. 544 (1928).
59 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 158.
60 Compare Ill. Civ. Prac. Act Anno. (Foundation Press, Chicago, 1933), p. 73.
with Hinton, Ill. Civ. Prac. Act Lectures (University of Chicago, Chicago, 1934),
pp. 59-62.
- Kaifer v. Kaifer, 286 Ill. App. 433, 3 N. E. (2d) 886 (1936), noted in 15
CHICAGo-KENT Raviw 72.
62 327 Ill. App. 55, 63 N. E. (2d) 615 (1945).
63 See Ill. Clv. Prac. Act Anno., pp. 73-5.
64 Straight v. Hanchett, 23 Ii1. App. 584 (1887).
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proceedings, with all the attendant learning as to the effect of a
plea puis darrein continuance, were obliterated by Section 39 of
the Civil Practice Act,65 which permits the use thereof to intro-
duce into the case any matters which may have arisen after the
original pleadings had been filed. That statute was applied in
Woodruff v. City of Chicago,6 a suit to recover money paid under
a special assessment proceeding, so as to permit the municipal
defendant to show that, subsequent to the original pleadings,
67
the public improvement was in fact completed. The general rules
of chancery have, therefore, been made applicable to pleadings in
law actions.
Little has been said on the subject of defensive answers. The
pleader should recognize, however, that there are intrinsic differ-
ences between affirmative allegations which serve to create nega-
tive defenses on the one hand and true affirmative defenses on the
other. There is no necessity for any answering pleading where
the former are-used for an issue has been reached, but in the case
of the latter a reply is required as the failure to reply operates as
an admission of the existence of the affirmative defense.6 8  The
appellant in Heil v. Kastengren69 failed to observe these distinc-
tions when he claimed that the plaintiffs, in a personal injury
action, had admitted that they were acting wilfully and wantonly
at the time of the accident because they had failed to reply to his
answer containing such charges. The court correctly pointed out
that the defensive allegations, while affirmative in form, merely
negatived the plaintiff's allegations- of freedom from contributory
negligence, did not constitute an affirmative defense, and necessi-
tated no reply.
Most questions with respect to the sufficiency of pleadings are
raised by some appropriate form of motion which must specify
65 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 163.
66326 Ill. App. 577, 63 N. E. (2d) 124 (1945). It is understood that leave to
appeal has been allowed.
67 The opinion does not indicate that supplemental pleadings were actually filed
settling up the new defensive matter. If they were not, objection to the proof
should have been sustained: Bordner v. lDepler, 142 Ill. App. 526 (190&).
66 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 156 and § 164 (2).
69 328 Ill. App. 301, 65 N. E. (2d1) 579 (1946).
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the particular defect complained of as well as the relief sought.70
As would be expected, in the light of the necessity that specification
be provided, much of the old learning with respect to the compass
of a general demurrer has become outmoded. According to People
far Use of Jones v. Leviton,71 one cannot, upon argument on such
a motion, take advantage of defects present but not specified nor
gain a type of relief improper under the circumstances. The
motion there involved sought judgment dismissing the action
because of a misjoinder of defendants and of counts. It was held
to be error to grant such motion on the ground that duplicity was
involved, as that fault had not been assigned as a basis for the
motion, and likewise error to dismiss the suit because of a mis-
joinder of parties since the Civil Practice Act directs that no action
shall be defeated for such fault.
72
Attention is again drawn, by the case of Hansen v. Raleigh,
73
to the fact that two distinct motions to dismiss are authorized by
different sections of the Civil Practice Act but that the same are
intrinsically unlike and they may not be used interchangeably.
The motion made pursuant to Section 48, with or without accom-
panying affidavits, is to be used only when one or more of the nine
situations therein enumerated exist,74 while that based on Section
45 cannot be aided by affidavits but must rest solely on matter
already found in the record.75 It was, therefore, there held error
to dismiss plaintiff's suit upon motion accompanied by affidavits
since the ground to support such motion could only be properly
raised pursuant to Section 45, if it appeared of record, and was
not one of the nine grounds specified in Section 48.
Where the situation is such that both of these motions might
70 Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 169.
71 327 Ill. App. 309, 64 N. E. (2d) 195 (1945).
72 I. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 150.
73 391 Il1. 536, 63 N. E. (26i) 851 (1945). Another aspect of this case, involving
the scope of the statutory immunity granted to firemen, was discussed in 24
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 257.
74 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 172.
75 Ibid., § 169.
76 It was also indicated that a defense based on an immunity conferred by stat-
ute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24, § 1-13, was an affirmative defense that should be
specially pleaded: Ibid., Ch. 110, § 167(4).
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be utilized, there is no ground for objection, according to Leitch v.
Hine,77 because the same are presented simultaneously even though
the first be in the nature of a demurrer and the second takes the
form of an affirmative defense through the use of accompanying
affidavits. While the former practice would have regarded it
objectionable to attempt to demur and plead at the same time,78
and would have treated the plea or answer as nullifying the de-
murrer, such is not the case under the present motion practice. It
was also indicated therein that the two motions might be incorpo-
rated in a single document, although each would still retain its
separate identity and purpose.
One ground for moving to dismiss, specified in Section 48 of
the Civil Practice Act, is that the cause of action "is barred by a
prior judgment. "7 The Leitch case also gave that phrase liberal
interpretation by holding that a former adjudication as to a
particular fact essential to the litigation, while not technically a
matter of res adjudicata, could be offered to support a motion to
dismiss. Some further elaboration thereof was provided by the
decision in Monroe v Collins,8" which held it proper to deny a
motion to dismiss when the prior adjudication relied on consisted
solely of the action of the Illinois Supreme Court in denying an
application for leave to institute an original proceeding therein
upon the same cause.8' As the granting of leave to file, made on
ex parte motion, would not operate to bar any defense, it was felt
that denial thereof should not possess the effect of adjudicating
the merits of plaintiff's claim to relief.
The pleader should, however, be cognizant of the fact that,
while an adverse ruling on a motion made pursuant to Section 48
is not waived by pleading over,_8 the old rules still continue as .to
an adverse ruling upon a motion based on Section 45, for that
77 393 Il1. 211, 66 N. E. (2d) 90 (1946).
78 Cobb v. Ingalls, 1 Ill. (Breese) 233 (1827).
79 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 172.
so 393 Ill. 553, 66 N. E. (2d) 670 (1946).
81 The circumstances which may warrant denial of such a request are pointed out
in J. A. Stanley and R. L. Severns, "The Original Jurisdiction of the Illinois Su-
preme Court," 22 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REV~mw 169, particularly pp. 176-92.
82 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 259.21.
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motion is akin to the common-law demurrer. The court, in Galvin
v. O'Neill,8 3 recognized that the defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action should have been
sustained, but held that any error in the ruling thereon had been
waived because the defendant subsequently answered and the
merits of the case were submitted for trial."4 If the pleader is
convinced of the correctness of his motion, his course of action
should be to stand by his motion, submit to judgment for default
of answer, and urge the error in the ruling as ground for reversal
on appeal.85
One other interesting sidelight on motion practice is provided
by Crown Building Corporation v. Monroe Amusement Corpora-
tion.86 Under the former practice, a motion to vacate a temporary
injunction would have been treated as a demurrer to the bill of
complaint, if no other answering pleading had been filed, thereby
necessarily confining the hearing to matters appearing on the face
of the bill. Affidavits showing extraneous matters could not be
used 7 unless an answer had been filed, 8  whereupon the motion
was to be decided according to the weight of the testimony adduced
through the pleadings or accompanying affidavits. It was argued,
in that case, that the former practice had been displaced by the
enactment of the Civil Practice Act and the rules adopted pursuant
thereto, 9 but such contention was rejected when the Appellate
Court could find no indication of an intention to change the former
practice. Persons moving to vacate interlocutory orders, there-
fore, should be careful to notice the condition of the pleadings and
whether or not issue has been formulated thereunder in order to
83 393 Ill. 475, 66 N. E. (2d) 403 (1946).
84 The court relied on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 166(3), to reach that con-
clusion. It merely recites that defects "not objected to in the trial court" shall be
deemed waived. The case of Beer v. Philips, I Ill. (Breese) 44 (1822), drawn from
the former practice, provides a better illustration of the controlling principles.
85 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Belt Ry. Co., 182 Ill. 33, 54 N. E. 1046 (1899).
86 326 Il1. App. 430, 62 N. E. (2d) 32 (1945).
87 Dunne v. County of Rock Island, 273 Ill. 53, 112 N. E. 342 (1916).
88 Wangelin v. Goe, 50 Ill. 459 (1869).
89 Counsel particularly relied on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 259.31, but that
rule was designed to require presentation of a motion to vacate the interlocutory
order prior to appeal in order to give the trial court a chance to correct any error
which may have occurred. It does not describe the practice upon such a motion.
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understand the proper scope of the hearing on such motion to
vacate.
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE
The idea that the formalities of a trial may be dispensed with
in simple cases where the uncontroverted facts can be made readily
apparent by affidavits offered in support of a motion for summary
judgment is implicit in Section 57 of the Civil Practice Act and
the accompanying rules.90 That section is limited, however, to four
rather simple cases, including those brought to recover pqssession
of land. The fact that the possession of land may be .involved,
however, is not enough to permit use of the summary judgment
procedure, according to Ward v. Sampson,91 if the litigation in
fact does involve other and more complicated issues. It was there
held error to base judgment upon a motion for summary judgment,
accompanied by affidavits, where the purpose of the action was to
secure an accounting, remove clouds on a title, as well as to regain
possession, since the first two requests were clearly outside the
scope of the four simple cases enumerated in Section 57. Much the
same views were applied to an attempt to secure summary judg-
ment therein on a counterclaim predicated on mistake and specific
performance.
Some innovations in the law with respect to discovery of evi-
dence were introduced by Section 58 of the Civil Practice Act,92
but the staute is silent as to coercive methods to assure disclosure
except as they may be provided-by rule of court.93 The decision in
Smith v. Thompson,94 however, would indicate that any remedy
provided by the act or by court rules is not exclusive and has not
operated to deprive the nisi prius courts of their innate power to
go Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, §§ 181, 259.15, and 259.16.
91391 I1. 585, 63 N. E. (2d) 751 (1945).
92 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 182.
93 Rule 18 of the Illinois Supreme Court, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Cb. 110, § 259.18,
does provide that refusal or neglect to disclose may carry the penalty of additional
costs and expenses made necessary thereby, which penalties are analogous to those
imposed for untrue pleading: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 165.
94327 Ill. App. 59, 63 N. E. (2d) 613 (1945), noted in 24 CmcAiO-KENT LAw
REviEw 264. That decision was followed in the simultaneous decision in Knaebel
v. Thompson, 327 Ill. App. 21, 63 N. E. (2d) 614 (1945).
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punish for contempt committed by deliberate refusal to grant
discovery. A wilful refusal to admit facts, made without justifica-
tion, may lead to far more severe penalties than the mere imposi-
tion of additional costs.
Although the technical rules of evidence have, in the main,
gone unchanged, the decision in Bell v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Company5 is worthy of notice, at least by lawyers trying cases
in the Municipal Court of Chicago. In that case, a suit on a life
insurance policy, the defendant offered certain public hospital and
public welfare records, pursuant to Rule 70 of that court, to estab-
lish the age of the insured.9 6 It was held proper to admit such
evidence, not only because of such rule9 7 but also because the
records were under the control of the county government hence
constituted public records. While the decision is of such limited
application that it leaves little to cheer lawyers engaged in trying
cases before other courts, it creates a breach of some practical
assistance to the trial attorney in the "Municipal Court of Chicago
who had hitherto been faced with technical obstacles preventing
the use of hospital, school or church records to establish proof in
meritorious cases.
Attention was called last year to the significance of a question
raised, but not determined,98 with respect to the right of a court
of equity to appoint a special commissioner to take proofs and
make findings of fact and recommendations based thereon. The
Appellate Court, in Simpson v. Harrison,99 has now decided that
95327 Ill. App. 321, 64 N. E. (2d) 204 (1945), noted in 41 Ill. L. Rev. 282.
96 Municipal Court Manual (1940), p. 46. The rule, in part, declares that any
"writing of record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made
as a memorandum of record of any act. transaction, occurrence or event, shall be
admissible . . . if the trial judge shall find that it was made in the regular course
of any business . . . upon the testimony of any witness who is familiar with the
regular course of business at the time in question, without the necessity of pro-
ducing the particular person who made the record or who furnished the informa-
tion on which it was based . . . The term 'business' shall include business, profes-
sion, occupation, and calling of every kind."
97 The court noted that the rule in question was substantially copied from a
federal statute, 28 U. S. C. A. § 695. Similar evidence has been received, pursuant
thereto, in federal courts: Pollack v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 138 F. (2d)
123 (1943).
98 Simpson v. Harrison, 389 Ill. 588, 60 N. E. (2d) 104 (1945), noted in 24
CmCAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 25-6. Cause transferred to Appellate Court because the
issues involved problems of practice and procedure rather than a freehold.
99 328 Ill. App. 425, 66 N. E. (2d) 494 (1946).
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there is no authority for such action, except in certain special
situations,' since the repeal of that portion of the Chancery Act
which had conferred a general power of appointment2 unless the
regularly constituted master in chancery is disqualified or unable
to act.3 In the light thereof, it was held that the purported pro-
ceedings before the special commissioner were a nullity, he being
coraw, non jiulice. There may be some occasion to consider the
necessity for a curative statute to protect titles based on convey-
ances-made by such special commissioners unless it could be urged
that failure to object had resulted in a waiver of the right to ques-
tion such transactions.
4
The reports redound with instances where verdicts and judg-
ments have been reversed for error in ruling on post-trial motions.
There is some occasion to believe, therefore, that the practice in
this respect might bear re-examination. The much litigated case of
Scott v. Freeport Motor Casualty Company,5 however, has thrown
considerable light on the modern practice with respect to post-
trial questioning of defects in pleadings through the use of the
motion in arrest of judgment. It serves to establish that but one
motion is now available instead of the distinctive motions hereto-
fore used by plaintiff and defendant respectively; that such motion
is confined in scope to examining questions based solely upon the
common-law record and then only to the extent that such errors
have not been waived; and that the statute purporting to abolish
all distinctions between the common-law record, the bill of excep-
tions, and the certificate of evidence,6 has no-application to the
hearing upon such motion, the trial court still being limited to the
' See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 40, § 16, and Ch. 68, § 22.
2 Cahill, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 22, § 39, repealed by Laws 1933, p. 812.
a Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 90, § 5.
4 In Mitchell v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 384 Ill. 258, 51 N. E. (2d) 271, 149 A. L. R.
369 (1943), it was held that active participation before the special master, without
objection, constituted a waiver of the right to question his authority for failure to
take the oath of office.
5392 Ill. 332, 64 N. E. (2d) 542 (1946), reversing 324 Ill. App. 529, 58 N. E. (2d)
618 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 335. Gunn, J., wrote a dis-
senting opinion concurred in by Fulton, J. Wilson, J., also dissented. Earlier
history of the litigation may be noted in 379 Ill. 155, 39 N. E. (2d) 999 (1942).
6 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 198(2).
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true common-law record.7 The case does evidence, however, some
indication of a return, by the majority judges of the Illinois
Supreme Court, to a narrow and technical attitude on the matter
of the sufficiency of-pleadings not in harmony with the spirit of
the Civil Practice Act,8 particularly in view of the fact that motions
of this character are not only dilatory in nature but often work
hardship on trial courts as well as litigants by nullifying the effect
of hours of patient labor.9
One other case might be mentioned as it deals with the control
which may be exercised over litigation after it has reached the trial
stage. An earlier Illinois case had recognized that while the typical
plaintiff retains control over his litigation and may dismiss it
almost at will, the same thing is not true with respect to one who
conducts litigation as a representative plaintiff, particularly where
those whom he purports to represent have intervened, for he must
obtain their consent to the dismissal also. 10 Even more limited is
his ability to dismiss after the representative suit has proceeded
to decree, according to Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Com-
pany," for then the rights of the persons vicariously represented
have to be taken into consideration. A motion therein, based upon
a stipulation by all persons actually present, to remand the cause,
thereby operating to vacate the decree, was consequently denied.
DAMAGES
While no new or altered principles have been enunciated with
respect to the law of Damages, the impact of increased costs of
living and the general inflationary trends would seem to be reflected
in the amounts of damages being awarded. An award of $50,000
for the loss of an arm in a car-coupling accident was held proper
in Howard v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal Railroad Corn-
7 That record may be supplemented, however, by exhibits attached to the plead-
ings: Morris v. Goldthorp, 390 Ill. 186, 60 N. E. (2d) 857 (1945).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 128.
9 See Shipman, Common Law Pleading (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1923), 3d
Ed., p. 529, and 24 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REvIEw 335, particularly pp. 338-41.
10 Lee v. City of Casey, 269 Ill. 604, 109 N. E. 1062 (1915).
11 392 111. 624, 65 N. E. (2d) 688 (1946).
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pany,1 2 but $75,000 was regarded as too much in another case for
the loss of a leg, so a new trial was ordered even though plaintiff
was willing to remit $40,000.13 It was also noted that the jury,
whose job it is to arrive at the present value of a future loss of
earning power, must be furnished with some formula or rule by
which they cbuld make the computation, 14 and in that regard it was
felt proper for the jury to take into consideration the fact that a
three per cent. return would be the highest yield, under present
conditions, that could be expected compatible to safety of
principal. 15
APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Surprisingly little of novel effect has been said during the
past year with respect to the law regulating appeals and appellate
procedure. A true appeal is confined for use only by parties to the
litigation,', but the former practice in this state permitted review
at the instance of a person not a party through a writ of error,
provided such person could demonstrate an interest in the judg-
ment or decree sought to be reviewed. 17 Section 81 of the Civil
Practice Act' s continues that practice except that review at the
instance of one who is not a party is now designated an "appeal."
The change in nomenclature has not, according to Gibbons v.
Cannaven,19 in any way changed the requirement that such person
must show an "interest" in the judgment sought to be reviewed
and, in the absence of a showing of such "interest," a motion to
dismiss the appeal must be sustained. In that case, review was
denied to a property owner whose tenant had been sued and had
suffered judgment for a violation of the Liquor Control Act,
20
12 327 I11. App. 83, 63 N. E. (2d) 774 (1945). Leave to appeal has been denied.
13 Murphy v. Friel, 328 Il1. App. 586, 6G N. E. (21) 450 (1946), abst. opin.
14 Hayes v. New York Cent. R. Co., 328 Ill. App. 631, 67 N. E. (2d) 215 (1946).
15 Howard v. Baltimore & 0. C. T. R. Co., 327 Ill. App. 83, 63 N. E. (2d) 774
(1945).
- People ex rel. Galloway v. Franklin Co. Bldg. Ass'n, 329 Iil. 582, 161 N. E. 56
(1928).
17 Leland v. Leland. 319 Ii. 426, 150 N. E. 270 (1920), holds that a co-respondent
in a divorce case lacks sufficient interest to obtain review.
is Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110. § 205.
19393 Il1. 376, 66 N. E. (2d) 370 (1946), affirming 325 I1. App. 337, 60 N. E. (2d)
254 (1945).
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 43, § 94 et seq.
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which judgment had become a lien on the owner's property,-1
because the essential "interest" was found to be lacking. The
claim that, as so construed, the statute was unconstitutional be-
cause it denied due process of law was rejected on the basis that
identical language in the Dram Shop Act of 1874 had been held to
amount to a valid exercise of the police power,22 and the sole
protection granted to th6 property owner was to defend any pro-
ceeding brought to enforce the lien.
A degree of laxity with respect to what constitutes a final and
appealable order is becoming evident from the judicial decisions
since the determination by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case
of Brauer Machine & Supply Company v. Parkhill Truck Corm-
pany,23 which had permitted an appeal from an order quashing the
service of process for lack of jurisdiction even though no judg-
ment had been entered dismissing the suit. Criticism of that
laxity is expressed by the dissenting judge in the more recent case
of Gould v. Klabunde24 wherein the trial court sfruck plaintiff's
complaint, refused to vacate such order, and denied judgment
against defendant as for a default in pleading, but entered no
other formal judgment. The majority of the court felt such orders
were sufficiently final and appealable 25 because of a belief that it
was the intention of the trial judge to terminate the suit on the
theory that jurisdiction over the cause was lacking.
One other point might be made with respect to the oppor-
tunity to secure review. Further review by the Supreme Court of
a decision of one of the several Appellate Courts is possible, in
this state, only in the fashion indicated by Section 75 of the Civil
Practice Act,26 which limits such additional review to cases where
21 Ibid., § 136.
22 Garrity v. Eiger, 272 Ill. 127, 111 N. E. 735 (1916), affirmed In 246 U. S. 97,
38 S. Ct. 300, 62 L. Ed. 596 (1918) ; Wall v. Allen, 244 Ill. 456, 91 N. E. 678, 18
Ann. Cas. 175 (1010).
23383 Il. 569, 50 N. E. (2d) 836 (1943). noted in 22 CHICAGo-K NT LAW REVIEW
207 and 42 Mich. L. Rev. 714.
24326 Ill. App. 643, 63 N. E. (2d) 258 (1945). Dove, P.J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
25 II. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 201.
26 Ibid.. § 199.
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a certificate of importance is issued or where leave to appeal has
been properly granted. The right to grant leave to appeal, in
actions ex contractu and in cases sounding in damages, is limited
by a proviso to the effect that the judgment must be for $1,500 or
more. Some clarification of that proviso was given recently in the
case of Zechman v. Zechman27 wherein the plaintiff sought review
in the Supreme Court of a decision of the Appellate Court affirm-
ing a decree of divorce which had granted plaintiff the sum of
$12.00 per week as permanent alimony. After leave to appeal had
been granted, the defendant-appellee moved to dismiss the appedl
oh the ground that the action was one ex contractu or sounding in
damages and that less than $1,500 was involved. 28 His motion was
denied when the court concluded that the original action was not
simply one for the dissolution of a contract but involved questions
of child custody and adjudication as to property rights as well,
hence did not require the presence of the jurisdictional amount to
support further review. There is reason to believe, however, that
if such issues were absent, the motion would have been granted.
Some cases affecting appellate procedure should also be noted.
Rule 33 of the Illinois Supreme Court,29 for example, not only
specifies the form and contents of the notice of appeal but also
authorizes amendment thereof to supply any of the requisites
which may have been omitted or incorrectly stated. In the light
thereof, it was regarded as proper, in People ex rel. Pickerill v.
New York Central Railroad Company,s° to permit amendment in
the reviewing court to supply formal parts to the notice of appeal
so long as the original notice sufficiently advised the successful
litigant of the essential purposes of the action being taken. It was
also there decided that separate appeals need not be taken as to
separate tax judgments entered as parts of a single tax proceeding,
27391 Ill. 510, 63 N. E. (2d) 499 (1945), affirming 324 II. App. 528, 58 N. E.
(2d) 254 (1944), abst. opin.
28 Further review in separate maintenance proceedings, on the theory that such
are actions ex contractu within the meaning of the statute even though they pro-
vide an equitable type of remedy, has been denied where the amount of the allow-
ance was less than the jurisdictional figure: Seelye v. Seelye, 143 Ill. 264, 32 N. E
427 (1892) ; Umlauf v. Umlauf, 103 Ill. 651 (1882).
29 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 259.33.
3o 391 Ill. 377, 63 N. E. (2d) 405 (1945).
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even though Section 237 of the Revenue Act 3 ' might be construed
to so require.
32
A logical sequitur to the holding in Bollaert v. Kankakee Tile
& Brick Company33 seems to have been achieved by the decision
in Le/fors v. Hayes.-4 The first of these cases had denied the trial
court power to permit an amendment of the pleadings after judg-
ment and the filing of notice of appeal. The later case now holds
that such amendment may be made, under proper circumstances, 35
in the reviewing court. Justification for such holding was said to
be found in Section 92(1) (2) of the Civil Practice Act which pur-
ports to declare that the appellate tribunals may exercise all of
the "powers of amendment of the trial court. "3 There is room for
doubt, however, as to the constitutionality of that provision, at
least as it applies to the several Appellate Courts in this state,37
so the apparently happy solution worked out to permit amendment
of the pleadings to conform to the proofs and findings may not be
so workable after all.
It has previously been noticed that the litigant who voluntarily
dismisses his suit in the trial court cannot move to have the dis-
missal order vacated unless jursisdiction for that purpose has
been expressly reserved.35 Much the same ruling is to be applied
to an appellant who voluntarily dismisses his appeal, according to
People cx rel. Waite v. Bristow,39 even though the order of dis-
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 120, § 718.
32 The court distinguished the instant case from the holding in People ex rel.
Hudson v. C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 360 Ill. 180, 195 N. E. 631 (1935).
33 317 Il. App. 120, 45 N. E. (2d) 506 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 244.
14327 Ill. App. 440, 64 N. E. (2d) 768 (1946), noted in 24 C-IicAGo-KENT LAW
REVIEW 262.
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 170, imposes some limitations on the right to
amend pleadings.
36 Ibid., § 216(1) (a).
37 See discussion of this point in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 262, particularly
pp. 263-4.
38 Fulton v. Yondorf, 324 Ill. App. 452, 58 N. E. (2d) 640 (1944), noted in 23
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 327.
39 391 Ill. 101, 62 N. E. (2d) 545 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
178. Gunn, J.. wrote a dissenting opinion. Other consequences of the holding may
be traced in the connected cases of Bradford Supply Co. v. Waite, 392 Ill. 318, 64
N. XE. (2d) 491 (1946), and People ex rel. Bradford Supply Co. v. Circuit Court,
393 Ill. 520, 66 N. E. (2d) 420 (1946).
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missal is obtained because the record fails to disclose the existence
of a final and appealable order. If a final order exists but is not
disclosed in the record, the proper action for the appellant to take
is to suggest a diminution of the record and to apply for leave to
supply the missing part.40 The case is especially significant be-
cause it would seem to indicate that the appellant may not, at the
time he moves to vacate the order of dismissal, also pray for leave
to appeal even though he can show the absence of culpable negli-
gence on his part.
41
ENFORCEMENT OF' JUDGMENTS
While there are no landmark cases during the past year with
regard to methods by which judgment orders and decrees may be
enforced, there are several cases deserving of at least brief com-
ment. One such case was that of Schultz v. Johnson 2 wherein
certain joint tenants, in order to defeat the rights of their credi-
tors, conveyed the premises to their mortgagee although they
remained in possession. When the creditor sued to set the convey-
ance aside as being fraudulent, he contended that the mortgage
had become merged with the fee so that the mortgagee lost his
prior rights thereunder. It was, nevertheless, held that no merger
had occurred especially since the creditor had, in no way, been
damaged by the transaction. In Mills v. Susanka,43 another fraud-
ulent transfer case, the Appellate Court found that, while the
parties to the transaction were "good friends and associated to-
gether socially," there was no evidence to indicate any fiduciary
relationship so it refused to relieve against the fraudulent trans-
fer, preferring to apply the "clean hands" maxim.
44
Aspects of procedure when applying for a body execution pur-
suant to Section 62 of the Judgments, Decrees and Executions
40 People v. Blevins, 251 Ill. 381, 96 N. E. 214, Ann. Cas. 1912C 451 (1911).
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 200.
42326 Ill. App. 223, 61 N. E. (2d) 273 (1945).
43 327 Ill. App. 367, 64 N. E. (2d) 216 (1945).
44 The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and, not in the period of
this survey, reversed the Appellate Court because It could find no reason to apply
the maxim as the transferor was not indebted to anyone, although a relative was.
See Mills v. Susanka, 394 Ill. 439, 68 N. E. (2d,) 904 (1946).
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Act 45 were dealt with in the case of Morris v. Schwartz.46 As it
was determined that the affidavit, upon which the writ issued, was
insufficient for failure to state the facts upon which the creditor
based his belief that the debtor had property but unjustly refused
to surrender the same, much of the language used in the opinion
is dicta. The case would indicate, however, that the debtor is not
entitled to notice and hearing before the body execution issues and
is given a hearing, if at all, only upon his application for discharge
pursuant to Section 5 of the Insolvent Debtors Act.
47
Questions concerning garnishment were raised in two cases.
In Roth v. Kaptowsky,8 the property sought to be reached con-
sisted of the proceeds of certain life insurance policies which had
become payable to the debtor-beneficiary. To a limited extent, the
court was obliged to interpret the exemption provision of the
insurance Code relating to life insurance proceeds. 49 The Appel-
late Court took the view that, as the exemption covers only the
"debts or liabilities of the insured," the funds were subject to
garnishment. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, avoided the
duty of passing on this interpretation by finding that the debtor-
beneficiary's conduct in making an election as to the manner of
payment under the policies was such as to prevent any fund from
coming into existence. In Morris v. Beatty,50 the Illinois Supreme
Court refused to determine specifically whether the contents of a
safety-deposit box may be reached by garnishment, preferring to
base its decision on the technical point that, for lack of traverse,
the garnishee 's allegation that "it had no control over the contents
of said box" had to stand as admitted. The primary question
must, therefore, be regarded as unsettled for the time being.
One other point might be mentioned. According to Section 70
45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 77, § 65.
4e326 I1. App. 274, 61 N. E. (2d) 690 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RzvrEw 191. Friend, J., and Scanlan, J., each wrote a specially concurring opinion.
47 Il1. Rev. Stat. -1945, Ch. 72, § 5.
48393 i1. 484, 66 N. E. (2d) 664 (1946), reversing 326 Il1. App. 415, 62 N. E.
(2d) 17 (1945).
49 I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 73, § 850.
50390 Ill. 568, 62 N. E. (2d) 478 (1945), noted in 24 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW REw
196, reversing 323 II. App. 390, 55 N. E. (2d) 830 (1944), noted In 23 CMicAGO-
KENT LAW Rmvmw 182.
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of the Civil Practice Act, no court shall set aside, quash or stay
any execution except upon notice of motion for that relief to "the
opposite party, or his attorney of record." 51 Reliance was placed
on that section by the judgment debtor in Holmes v. Fanyo,52 to
prevent further proceedings under a judgment more than seven
years old,53 despite the creditor's claim that the period for which
proceedings had been stayed should not be counted, 54 on the ground
that any stay order which might have been granted was void for
lack of notice to the judgment debtor. It appeared that the stay
order had been granted at the request of an intervening petitioner
who claimed an interest in the judgment. Notice to support such
order had apparently been given by such intervenor only to the
judgment creditor. The court concluded that the "opposite party"
referred to in Section 70 had to be a person who would be adversely
affected by the stay order, meant but a single person, and could
apply only to a judgment creditor. As notice to the judgment
debtor was deemed unnecessary, the court therefore decided that
the stay had been a valid one so the judgment, and execution there-
under, were still enforcible.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
In only one case during the period of this survey has it been
necessary for the courts to attempt to define the substantive ele-
ments of a crime. The indictment returned in the case of People
v. HardtI' charged the defendant with the crime of malicious mis-
chief in defacing a certain dwelling house.2 It further charged
that the dwelling in question was in the lawful possession of cer-
tain persons "who were then and there lessees of said building"
and that the acts done were done without the consent of such
lessees. Defendant's motion to quash the indictment was sustained
by the trial court on the ground that the statute made such acts
51.11. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 194.
52326 Ill. App. 624, 63 N. ED. (24) 249 (1945).
5s nil. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 77, § 6.
54 Ibid., § 2.
1329 Ill. App. 153, 67 N. E. (2d) 487 (1946).
2 11. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 425.
